

NSC Meeting

MBFR & CDE

13 January 1984

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Executive Secretary

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January 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

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Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

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and International Affairs
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Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
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Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
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United States
Representative to the United
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BG George A. Joulwan
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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
Chief Negotiator
Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) -- Friday,
January 13, 1984 (C)

Attached is an interagency discussion paper providing an Overview of MBFR
Options for use at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the
White House Cabinet Room on Friday, January 13, 1984, at 11:00 a.m. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment as Noted

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NOVEMBER 4, 1983

Overview of MBFR Options

In his decisions of October 14 and October 29, 1983, the President directed that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, working with the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on NATO Conventional Forces and Arms Control, review alternative MBFR options and possible negotiating strategies for the future. The attached papers, which include fleshed-out options and a revised verification annex, respond to this tasking.

Status of the Negotiations

The President has decided that US policy for the current MBFR negotiations is that both a data agreement and a comprehensive NATO verification package are essential prerequisites for a treaty signature and for any initial US-Soviet reductions.

During the current negotiating round in Vienna, the West has continued to press its approach to reductions, verification and data. The West has explained its rationale and has proposed possible modalities for focusing further discussion on verification in order to make progress where such progress is possible.

The East has pressed hard for a "constructive" Western response to the draft treaty it tabled in Vienna on June 23, 1983, and to its earlier proposals of February 17, 1983 calling for US/Soviet mutual example reductions, a freeze, and reductions to parity without prior data agreement. The Western Ad Hoc Group assessment of the Eastern draft treaty states, "On balance the draft moves the East somewhat closer to the Western concept of an MBFR agreement, especially with regard to verifiable parity. However, the draft does not provide assurances that the East will actually take the asymmetrical reductions needed to reach parity, and its proposed verification measures are still inadequate."

On October 25, in an unexpected move, Eastern representatives presented a significant modification in their position by proposing that the sides exchange plans for inviting observers to the reductions of the most significant contingents and include in the plans information on the numerical strength, nationality, designation and location of those contingents. This proposal modifies the East's earlier opposition to any numerically specified reductions to equal levels and to any real numerical verification of those reductions. This new Eastern position ensures that observation of reductions will take place on a predictable basis and not solely at the invitation of the reducing side.

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Having made those moves, the East has taken the position that any further moves are now up to the West, and the East will take no more initiatives in the absence of a Western response. Soviet representatives have taken the same position in bilateral discussions with us regarding the US probe on verification which was launched in June.

A recent delegation assessment of the current situation in the negotiations makes the following points: "In looking at the new Eastern position, we should consider whether we can take advantage of the opportunities provided by these concessions to bring the East still further towards US MBFR objectives. For example, the East's willingness to specify the 'bulk' of reductions could provide an opening to introduce specific numbers -- which the Soviets have been resisting for years -- into the reduction and monitoring process. Eastern moves on verification provide possibilities for pinning down the Soviets more firmly on an effective verification system in MBFR.

"Actually taking advantage of these opportunities is another question. Eastern representatives have told us that having presented these new proposals and having answered Western questions, they will make no further moves in the absence of a Western counterproposal. While this position could change, it seems to us unlikely to do so for some time."

The delegation has also called attention, as has USATO, to growing differences among the Allies on MBFR negotiating policy. The delegation assessment states, "As we perceive it from here, the Germans, Dutch, Canadians and Nordics feel that the US and UK are too rigid and are assuming too defensive a posture in this negotiation. They are also concerned that the East has substantially enhanced its posture not only in the MBFR negotiations but publicly, and that this could diminish the credibility of the West's overall arms control posture in Western public opinion. These Allies are looking to the US for a lead and to NATO for a new position. While this has not yet become a major issue, it is percolating at senior government levels, particularly in Canada (Trudeau's Guelph speech), the Netherlands, and Germany..... It also appears likely that the Alliance posture on MBFR will be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting."

In addition, Chancellor Kohl has written to the President, pleading for a new Western initiative in the negotiations along the lines of the FRG approach.

Options

Against this background, the MBFR IG has examined a range of options, which are briefly summarized below. As a benchmark for comparison, the current Western position in MBFR is summarized first.

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Common to all the options is the need, following a US decision, to coordinate our position first with the UK and FRG trilaterally, then with the other Allies in NATO.

All options are compatible with further work on associated measures including an enhanced Measure 6 on exchange of information, which the delegation proposed in connection with Option Three.

Current Position

The current Western position, embodied in the draft treaty tabled on July 8, 1982, envisages the following sequence of steps:

- Agree on data (i.e., current totals for NATO and Warsaw Pact military manpower in Central Europe).

- Agree on size of reductions to parity, at about 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground and air personnel combined, on each side.

- Agree on verification measures (a package of seven verification and confidence-building measures is contained in Annex II to the Western draft treaty).

- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.

- Implement verification measures and reductions.

- US reduces 13,000 ground personnel in first stage; USSR reduces 30,000.

- All direct participants reduce in three subsequent stages.

- Reductions to be completed within seven years.

Option One: Retain the current approach requiring agreement on data and a verification package as prerequisites for treaty signature and initial US-Soviet reductions.

Under this option a short-term and a long-term approach are suggested. Both essentially retain the principles of the current approach as defined by its sequence of steps. The longer-term approach, however, suggests fundamental modifications to elements of our MBFR position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive study of its ramifications. The short-term proposal is designed to press the East for further movement on verification and to serve as a response to the latest Eastern proposals, while avoiding conflict with longer-range possibilities.

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Near-term Proposals

Alternatives under this approach all require redrafting the current verification annex to the West's draft treaty, especially improving our exchange of information measure, but accepting part of the East's language for other measures where possible. Alternative presentations follow:

-- present new draft verification annex (this would respond to Eastern claim that we have not modified our position since 1979, but would risk rejection of the whole based on reference to unacceptable parts);

-- present modified elements of the annex (this would prolong discussion and perhaps provide more negotiating flexibility to engage the East in discussion of modalities of specific measures);

-- propose a joint drafting exercise on verification provisions (this would probably appear to be the most positive form of response and might elicit greater movement by the East, but might be taken by some as a signal that the sides were much closer than they are).

Longer-term Proposals

The following proposals require study for possible adoption in the long-term:

-- change from manpower to force structure (or other unit of account) in our data discussion and for specification of reductions and limitations;

-- modify our position on exceptions to the ceilings for exercise purposes;

-- modify our position on the reduction of armaments;

-- examine the staging of reductions, including consideration of more significant initial reductions, reaching parity quicker, and possible inclusion of other non-indigenous forces in initial reductions;

-- agree with Allies prior to treaty signature on a set of graduated, automatic responses to low-level warning events.

Option Two: Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature, but before reductions; then reduce to parity

This option envisages the following sequence:

-- Agree on parity goal.

- Agree on verification measures proposed by the West.
- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.
- Implement the verification measures.
- Agree on data.
- Agree on size of reductions to parity.
- Implement reductions in stages, with verification of residual levels following each stage.

Option Three: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions (Delegation option)

This option envisages the following sequence:

- (1) Agree on verification measures proposed by West, including format for the exchange of information (Associated Measure 6), and on sequence for reductions and implementing verification measures.
- (2) Agree on an interim agreement of 30 months' duration containing the following points:
 - Initial US-Soviet reductions of 13,000-30,000 with exit entry points, to be completed with 12 months.
 - Following these reductions, a non-increase commitment on collective level of each side's manpower for period of 18 months.
 - At beginning of freeze, sides would provide information on forces according to Associated Measure 6 format, and would implement all verification measures to confirm information.
 - After 18-month freeze, if sides satisfied that force data information provided was accurate, sides would proceed to sign and ratify formal treaty covering reductions to parity in three years, with amount of each side's reductions specified in treaty based on the agreed data and with all verification measures in effect from outset. If sides not satisfied that data/information is correct, all obligations would be voided.
- (3) Sign and implement this interim agreement (initial reductions and freeze).
- (4) Continue negotiations on draft treaty.
- (5) If data agreement reached by end of 18-month freeze period, sign and ratify treaty on reductions to parity in 3 years.
- (6) Implement treaty reductions to parity.

SG Option: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions on basis of mutual example.

This option envisages the following sequence:

- US and USSR agree on size of initial US-Soviet reductions, and withdraw them on basis of mutual example, through designated permanent exit/entry points.

- Following these reductions, the sides would enter into numerically specified commitments not to increase collective level of manpower, based either on agreed data or on non-agreed data provided by each side provided agreement reached on all verification measures proposed by West. Duration of this commitment limited to specified time.

- If sides satisfied that data agreement has been reached, sides would sign and ratify a treaty on reductions to parity, with reductions specified based on the agreed data, along lines of current Western draft treaty.

WR Option: Postpone data agreement until after large US-Soviet Phase I Reductions.

This option envisages the following sequence:

- Agree on size of "minimum" US (e.g., 25,000) and Soviet (e.g., 60,000) reductions.

- Agree on residual ceilings for US (about 200,000) and USSR (about 400,000).

- Agree on verification measures West has proposed.

- Sign and ratify agreement.

- Implement these reductions and verification measures.

- Agreement that these ceilings had been reached would provide agreed data base.

- All direct participants would enter into "mutual political commitment" not to take actions which would undermine the objective of parity, for fixed duration, during which agreement might be reached on data and the process for reductions to parity.

- If agreement reached on data, sign and ratify and implement treaty on reductions to parity, similar to Western draft treaty.

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~~OPTION: THE POSTPONEMENT OF DATA AGREEMENT~~
 UNTIL AFTER TREATY SIGNATURE, BUT BEFORE REDUCTIONS;
 THEN REDUCTIONS TO PARITY

I. Description of Option

This option is would establish a sequence of: treaty signature, verification, data agreement, then reduction in stages, with further verification and agreement on force levels before each stage. Its rationale is that it would: (i) answer Soviet charges that the West seeks information on its force levels without being willing to commit itself to reductions or to use inflated intelligence figures to pursue unfair advantage; (ii) if rejected by the Soviets, place them on the record as opposing verification; and (iii) if accepted, permit resolution of the data dispute through actual observation, while (iv) providing the West with a means of halting the reductions process at the first indication of Soviet non-compliance.

A. Verification:

The West's full package of Associated Measures would be accepted by the East prior to treaty signature, and would be a precondition for such signature. They would be formally codified in the treaty, which would (except for postponement of data agreement and likely modification in the number of reductions phases) be the 1982 Western draft treaty.

Implementation would begin after treaty signature and before reductions, and would continue in stages during the reductions process (see C. below). Agreement on residual force levels would be required prior to each reductions tranche.

This option does not in any way diminish the effectiveness of the West's verification package. As with the current Western approach, the East would be committed by treaty to the verification measures, and would know that any impediments placed in the way of implementation would prevent all progress towards reductions. While initial implementation would precede data agreement, Western data could de facto remain the baseline, as we would be under no obligation to proceed with reductions unless we were satisfied with the results of the initial verification, and we could set our own standards for "being satisfied".

As with all MBFR options, the basic difficulty in assessing acceptability is uncertainty about ultimate Soviet willingness to countenance any agreement leading to a parity outcome. This option does, however answer Soviet charges that we seek to obtain information on their force structure without making any real commitment to reductions. We would in effect be offering

upon implementation of satisfactory verification measures leading to data agreement. Whether this would be more palatable to the Soviets than our current position is uncertain, but it could hardly be less so. At any rate, Soviet rejections of this proposal would represent a propaganda windfall for us, as it would enable us to point out that here, as in other arms control endeavours, a basic stumbling block is Soviet unwillingness to accept effective verification. The likelihood of Soviet compliance again depends ultimately upon uncertain Soviet objectives. But since satisfactory compliance would be a prerequisite for each stage of reductions, inadequate compliance would simply halt the reductions process without placing the West in a disadvantageous position, if the reductions tranches were small enough (see C.).

B. Data agreement:

Data agreement would initially be reached following treaty signature and after implementation of the West's package of Associate Measures. It would be required after each reductions tranche in order for the next tranche to occur.

This approach could be used with a variety of different units of account. Clearly, it could be used most effectively with whatever unit of account the intelligence community felt best permitted accurate monitoring and unequivocal verification.

C. Scale and Phases of Reductions:

The exact number of reductions tranches would depend largely upon two factors: intelligence community monitoring requirements, and the need for the tranches to be relatively small so that in the event of shortfall of Eastern reductions in a particular tranche (which would be exposed by subsequent verification and would stop the reductions process), the West would not be significantly disadvantaged militarily.

D. Treaty Signature:

A formal MBFR treaty setting forth the verification and reductions process described above, and incorporating the other aspects of the Western draft treaty of 1982, would be signed in Vienna and ratified by the Senate. (Given their experiences with SALT II, the Soviets are highly unlikely to accept anything short of ratification.) Signature would be followed by verification, data agreement, and the staged reductions process.

D. Impact on NATO's ability to respond to a crisis:

This would not differ from the impact of an MBFR agreement under the present Western position.

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We would seek initial trilateral agreement on the acceptability of this approach (the UK will doubtless regard it as overadventurous, the FRG as overconservative, but we might be able to get each to agree to this middle position to guard against something "worse" from their perspectives). If such agreement was forthcoming, we could either move directly to introduce the proposal in NATO, or carry out bilateral explorations with the Soviets and further trilateral evaluations of their response (see B) prior to discussion in the Alliance.

B. Bilateral and Multilateral Channels:

The relative emphasis given to a bilateral or multilateral channels would depend upon the basic aims of our move. If the principal goal was to give a high public profile to our desire for progress in MBFR while forcing the Soviets to go on record as opposing verification, we would want to move the proposal quickly to the multilateral channel. If we placed a higher value on seeking Soviet acceptance of this proposal, and initial soundings indicated genuine Soviet interest in it, we would wish to continue with more extensive and explicit bilateral contacts before going public.

C. Likely Soviet Response:

As mentioned above, it is impossible to ascertain accurately the degree of Soviet interest this proposal would generate, given our uncertainty as to what the Soviet bottom line for an MBFR agreement is. Any interest that was present would (as with other options) presumably be communicated bilaterally. The East could be expected to respond to a formal Western tabling of a proposal along these lines by a statement highlighting its supposed inequities and calling for the West to agree to the current Eastern proposals.

D. Implications for INF, CDE

INF deployments will certainly have taken place long before this or any MBFR proposal could bear visible fruit. The potential usefulness of this move for smoothing the progress of continued deployments by highlighting Western commitment to arms control would clearly depend in part on how much intensity the INF issue continued to generate following initial deployments. Even if INF continues to be a contentious issue, however, it is unlikely that any move in a non-nuclear and relatively forgotten arms control endeavour such as MBFR would have much countervailing effect.

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OPTION 3: POSTPONEMENT OF DATA AGREEMENT UNTIL
 AFTER INITIAL U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS

Description

The sides would negotiate an interim agreement of limited duration covering: initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, a freeze period during which force data/information would be exchanged and verified to the satisfaction of both sides, and a declaration of intent to sign a formal treaty on reductions to parity on the basis of the verified (agreed) data. Details of the verification measures to be implemented at each stage would be agreed.

This interim agreement would include the following points:

1. Initial US/Soviet reductions would be completed within one year. The US would withdraw 13,000 and the Soviets 30,000. The US and USSR would exchange lists of the units/personnel to be withdrawn. Exit/entry points would be established for U.S.-Soviet forces.
2. Following completion of these initial reductions, the sides would agree not to increase the collective level of their military manpower in the area of reductions for a period of 18 months.
 - A. At the beginning of this period, the sides would provide information on their forces existing in the area according to the following format: (this would be AM-6, i.e., information and data on structure down to battalion/regiment level, including numerical strengths of units).
 - B. At the beginning of this period, the sides would also put into effect the following verification measures: permanent exit/entry points with observers (AM-5); on-site inspections (AM-4); prior notification of military movements into area (AM-3). The consultative commission would also be established.
 - C. The sides would have 18 months to confirm, through the AMs and national means, that the data/information provided under AM-6 was accurate. Questions could be raised in the consultative commission.
 - D. If, at the end of this 18-month period, the sides were satisfied that the information provided by each side was accurate, the sides would sign and ratify a formal treaty covering reductions to parity within three years. All AMs would be in effect during the three years and for the duration of the treaty. The amount of each side's reductions would be specified in the treaty based on the force data agreed at the end of the freeze period.

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A. If, at the end of that 18-month-period, either side (through procedures agreed by the consultative commission) declared itself not satisfied that the information provided was accurate, all obligations would be voided.

3. The sides would continue to work out the details of the treaty on reductions to parity during the 30-month duration of this interim agreement.

Treaty Signature and Other Modalities

The understanding described above would be worked out by the delegations and would provide the basis for an interim agreement. There is flexibility on the actual form of the interim agreement. An executive agreement of limited duration (30 months), signed by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State of all direct participants, might be appropriate. The interim agreement would go into effect upon signature.

If the sides agreed to proceed with reductions to parity, that agreement would be a formal treaty to be ratified according to the constitutional procedures of each state. Signature could be by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State.

Scale and Phases of Reductions

After the initial understanding is signed:

-- The U.S. would withdraw 13,000 troops and the USSR would withdraw 30,000 troops. Withdrawals would be completed within one year.

-- After these reductions, neither side would increase the collective level of its military manpower. This freeze period would last 18 months.

If, after this 30-month period, the sides decide to sign the treaty, then, after treaty ratification:

-- The sides would take the specified amounts of reductions leading to the establishment of the agreed common collective ceilings. These reductions would be completed within three years.

Verification Measures

The verification measures to accompany each of the reduction steps would be specified in the interim agreement. Thus, before any reductions were taken, the sides would agree that:

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required for Western acceptance of the treaty, it must be presumed that the East generally intends to comply with their legal obligations.

During the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions phase and the freeze period, it might be argued that the East would have less incentive to comply since the obligations undertaken would not be in treaty form. They might be willing to take greater risks at marginal cheating. However, since the interim agreement is of limited duration, the East might consider the risk of detection too great. There is a risk that the East will not provide accurate data/information under AM-6, but that risk exists with the current Western draft treaty and its requirement for agreed data prior to reductions. It could be argued that the risks were less under this Option 3 since we would not have to abrogate a treaty in the event of Eastern non-compliance. There is inherently some risk of Eastern cheating, but large-scale cheating or misreporting should be ascertainable, especially since this option provides an 18-month verification period.

Data Agreement

The interim agreement would specify that, at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would exchange information on their forces in the area at that time, according to an agreed format. That format (Associated Measure 6) would be described in the interim agreement. The sides would then have 18 months to check out the accuracy of the information provided.

The enhanced Associated Measure 6 provides that information would be given on force structure down to battalion level, and would include numerical strengths of the units. Thus, instead of data agreement solely on the basis of aggregate totals of manpower as under our current draft treaty, data agreement would be based on force structure which is more compatible with our own national means of monitoring Eastern forces. Also, unlike our current draft treaty where we are essentially demanding Eastern agreement to our current data, under Option 3 and the enhanced Associated Measure 6, we would be determining the accuracy or non-accuracy of the specific information provided by the East under Associated Measure 6.

Possible Negotiating Strategy

Consultations with Allies

If this option were selected, we would first call a U.S.-U.K.-FRG trilateral meeting to coordinate positions. Such a meeting could be held in December; alternatively, the three could reach agreement on the margins of the December 8-9 NATO Ministerial. Although the FRG prefers minimal linkage among the three steps and wanted a NATO initiative phrased in terms of statements of principle rather than as a new proposal for an agreement as this option is

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-- For the initial U.S.-Soviet withdrawals: the U.S. and USSR would exchange lists of the forces to be withdrawn; exit/entry points would be established through which all withdrawals and all U.S. and Soviet forces entering would pass; non-interference with NTM. These verification measures would be in effect for the 12-month duration of the withdrawal stage. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to verify the withdrawals and to monitor U.S. and Soviet force levels).

-- For the freeze period: at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would provide the information of its forces existing in the area according to the previously agreed format, and the following verification measures would go into effect: exit/entry points, on-site inspection, prior notification of movements into area. These verification measures would last for the 18-month duration of the freeze period. (Comment: The purposes of the verification measures would be to confirm the data/information provided and to confirm/ update our data base for Eastern forces).

-- For reductions to parity: If the treaty is signed, all verification measures would go into effect upon ratification and would continue for the duration of the treaty. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to monitor and verify reductions and maintenance of the common collective ceilings.)

Assessment of effectiveness. For the freeze period and for reductions to parity under the treaty, if signed, the effectiveness of the verification measures would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

For the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, the measures noted would be adequate to confirm the withdrawals and to keep track of U.S.-Soviet force movements for the purpose of monitoring U.S. and Soviet force levels. The absence of on-site inspection for this period of one year would have only marginal effect on our ability to monitor the obligations undertaken.

Likelihood of Soviet acceptance/compliance. The likelihood of the East accepting Western verification measures would be somewhat enhanced under this option (compared to the current Western draft treaty) since the West would have met the East part way on the reductions issues of Eastern interest. However, given the requirement for data agreement (and its presumption of large asymmetrical reductions) prior to the treaty on reductions to parity, it remains unlikely that the East would accept this Option as is.

For the treaty on reductions to parity, the likelihood of Soviet compliance with obligations would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty. It can be expected that the East will take a very narrow interpretation of their obligations and that there will be disputes. However, if the East did agree to the data agreement

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now structured, they would probably support this option without significant change. The U.K. prefers not to make any initiative on data and would prefer their own option if a data initiative were deemed desirable. The U.K. would resist this option, but if the U.S. and FRG were to insist on it, the U.K. would probably acquiesce but would probably suggest changes.

Once the U.S., U.K. and FRG agreed to a coordinated position, we would introduce this option into NATO for Allied approval. Most of our Allies support making a data initiative, so there would probably be little difficulty in gaining Allied acceptance. If the option were introduced into NATO by the end of this year, guidance to the Ad Hoc Group could probably be agreed in time to table the initiative at the beginning of next round, which begins January 26.

Multilateral and Bilateral Channels

A primary purpose of Option 3 is to neutralize Eastern pressure on reductions issues so that we can engage in detailed discussion of data/verification. We should pursue this objective both in the formal negotiations and in bilateral channels.

If this option were selected, we should not let the current negotiating round end without bilateral contact. We want the Soviets to continue to give attention to verification issues during the recess. We should therefore indicate that we will have a constructive response to their February/June proposals next round and that we then expect them to be prepared to engage in detailed discussion of verification. Once the initiative is tabled in Vienna, we would pursue such discussions with the Soviets, primarily in Vienna, with the objective of pressing the East to accept the substance as well as the principle of our verification measures.

In the formal negotiations, we may want to establish working groups to work on associated measures and reductions issues, which would permit us to manage the interface between the bilateral and multilateral channel by directing formal Allied discussions on verification issues, thus ensuring that the bilateral channel does not get too far ahead of the Allies.

Likely Soviet Response

Despite the fact that this option would not meet several important Soviet interests (it does not accept mutual example cuts; it retains the requirement for agreed data at a later stage), the Soviets would welcome the data move as a step in the right direction. The Soviets will probably attempt to use Western interest in discussion of verification issues as leverage to gain Western concessions on reductions issues, e.g., on armaments.

Nevertheless, it would seem that the Soviets would agree to more detailed discussion of data/verification issues. They have

further if the West would respond to their overall proposals. The fact that the Soviet Military Representative has, apparently, taken personal initiative in furthering our data/verification discussions indicates that such Soviet statements have at least some backing in the Soviet Defense Ministry and thus some potential for development.

Where such discussions might lead is uncertain: probably not to an agreement, since we would still face the problem of asymmetrical reductions even if the Soviets were to make further concessions on verification. But detailed discussions of data/verification, especially on our enhanced Associated Measure 6, could only be useful to us.

Impact on INF, CDE

If the Soviets walk out of INF, our Allies will probably be anxious to step up activity in other arms control forums, including (and perhaps especially) MBFR, to underline the fact that the West remains flexible on arms control. In any case, INF discussions will probably be resumed sometime next year, one way or another, and the Allies will continue to be concerned that the overall Western negotiating posture be positive and credible. A Western MBFR initiative along the lines of this option would meet these interests.

It is in the U.S. interest to keep CDE focused on confidence-building measures and to avoid discussion of force reductions in that 35-nation forum. MBFR remains the only forum we have for addressing force reductions as an Alliance and in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context. Even those of our Allies who share our view that MBFR is the preferred forum for force reductions equally want to ensure that such discussions remain active in one forum or another. Continued stalemate in MBFR will encourage our Allies to look to CDE for that purpose. This option would spark useful activity in MBFR and would bolster NATO's public posture on arms control.

Impact on NATO's Ability to Respond to Crisis

NATO military studies of the Western 1979 package of associated measures concluded that the package could assist NATO political decision-making in time of crisis, since a violation of an associated measure would add to NATO's warning indicators and information about Warsaw Pact intentions. The alert activity exception to Associated Measure One, and the Western requirements for negotiated exceptions to the common ceiling were designed to protect NATO mobilization/reinforcement capability in a crisis.

This option does not change the substance of the Western package of associated measures (it does delay implementation of on-site inspection and exchange of information for one year) or the Western position on alert activities or exceptions. Therefore, the assessment of this option's impact on NATO's ability to respond in a crisis should be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

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will have to be monitored and controlled carefully regardless
of whether this option is chosen or the current Western
position is maintained. Choice of this option would not alter
the current framework of that issue.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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October 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE AMBASSADOR TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND
BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

SUBJECT: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) (U)

The President has decided that U.S. policy for the current MBFR negotiations is that both a data agreement and a comprehensive NATO verification package are essential prerequisites for a treaty signature and for any initial U.S.-Soviet reductions. The President has also instructed that we continue to press for elaboration and movement concerning the East's proposed verification measures. At the same time, the President has directed that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, working with the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on NATO Conventional Forces and Arms Control, will review alternative MBFR options and possible negotiating strategies for the future. Tasking for this review follows. (S)

Under the guidance of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, the IG should review alternative means of pressing the Soviets for elaboration and movement under our current approach. The IG should also explore possible alternative approaches that take account of implications for other arms control negotiations, including INF and CDE. This review should include options and variants presented in the MBFR Options paper discussed by the NSC on September 6, as well as any further options and variants which the IG believes may warrant consideration. (C)

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Under each such option, the analysis should clearly delineate, for each of the following elements, its specific content, when agreement would be reached on it, and when it would be implemented relative to the other elements: (1) Verification Measures, (2) Data Agreement, (3) Reductions, and (4) Treaty Signature or other modalities. (S)

① The discussion of Verification Measures should include an assessment of their effectiveness and of the ^②likelihood of Soviet acceptance and compliance. The discussion of Data Agreements should include, where appropriate, a review of relative merits of different units of account. The discussion of Reductions should include scale and phases for such reductions. The discussion of Treaty Signature modalities should include specifics on the timing and on diplomatic level of the signatories involved (e.g., Ambassador, Secretary of State). (S)

The discussion of possible negotiating strategies for each option should include:

- An assessment of the impact of proposed provisions and timing of each option upon other arms control negotiations, particularly CDE and INF.
- A strategy for dealing with the East in bilateral and multilateral fora, to include means for pressing for movement in the Soviet position and estimates concerning the likely Soviet reaction to each option.
- A plan for consulting with our NATO Allies, particularly the UK and the FRG, to include consideration of different Allied views and an assessment of each option's possible impact on NATO's ability to reach political decisions on reinforcement and/or mobilization in a crisis. (S)

The work outlined above is to be completed by the IG by November 18 for review by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane
Robert C. McFarlane

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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Executive Registry

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January 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col (P) John Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

BG George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
Chief Negotiator
Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) -- Friday,
January 13, 1984 (C)

Attached is an interagency discussion paper providing an Overview of MBFR
Options for use at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the
White House Cabinet Room on Friday, January 13, 1984, at 11:00 a.m. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment as Noted

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Overview of MBFR Options

In his decisions of October 14 and October 29, 1983, the President directed that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, working with the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on NATO Conventional Forces and Arms Control, review alternative MBFR options and possible negotiating strategies for the future. The attached papers, which include fleshed-out options and a revised verification annex, respond to this tasking.

Status of the Negotiations

The President has decided that US policy for the current MBFR negotiations is that both a data agreement and a comprehensive NATO verification package are essential prerequisites for a treaty signature and for any initial US-Soviet reductions.

During the current negotiating round in Vienna, the West has continued to press its approach to reductions, verification and data. The West has explained its rationale and has proposed possible modalities for focusing further discussion on verification in order to make progress where such progress is possible.

The East has pressed hard for a "constructive" Western response to the draft treaty it tabled in Vienna on June 23, 1983, and to its earlier proposals of February 17, 1983 calling for US/Soviet mutual ample reductions, a freeze, and reductions to parity without prior data agreement. The Western Ad Hoc Group assessment of the Eastern draft treaty states, "On balance the draft moves the East somewhat closer to the Western concept of an MBFR agreement, especially with regard to verifiable parity. However, the draft does not provide assurances that the East will actually take the asymmetrical reductions needed to reach parity, and its proposed verification measures are still inadequate."

On October 25, in an unexpected move, Eastern representatives presented a significant modification in their position by proposing that the sides exchange plans for inviting observers to the reductions of the most significant contingents and include in the plans information on the numerical strength, nationality, designation and location of those contingents. This proposal modifies the East's earlier opposition to any numerically specified reductions to equal levels and to any real numerical verification of those reductions. This new Eastern position ensures that observation of reductions will take place on a predictable basis and not solely at the invitation of the reducing side.

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Having made those moves, the East has taken the position that any further moves are now up to the West, and the East will take no more initiatives in the absence of a Western response. Soviet representatives have taken the same position in bilateral discussions with us regarding the US probe on verification which was launched in June.

A recent delegation assessment of the current situation in the negotiations makes the following points: "In looking at the new Eastern position, we should consider whether we can take advantage of the opportunities provided by these concessions to bring the East still further towards US MBFR objectives. For example, the East's willingness to specify the 'bulk' of reductions could provide an opening to introduce specific numbers -- which the Soviets have been resisting for years -- into the reduction and monitoring process. Eastern moves on verification provide possibilities for pinning down the Soviets more firmly on an effective verification system in MBFR.

"Actually taking advantage of these opportunities is another question. Eastern representatives have told us that having presented these new proposals and having answered Western questions, they will make no further moves in the absence of a Western counterproposal. While this position could change, it seems to us unlikely to do so for some time."

The delegation has also called attention, as has USRATO, to growing differences among the Allies on MBFR negotiating policy. The delegation assessment states, "As we perceive it from here, the Germans, Dutch, Canadians and Nordics feel that the US and UK are too rigid and are assuming too defensive a posture in this negotiation. They are also concerned that the East has substantially enhanced its posture not only in the MBFR negotiations but publicly, and that this could diminish the credibility of the West's overall arms control posture in Western public opinion. These Allies are looking to the US for a lead and to NATO for a new position. While this has not yet become a major issue, it is percolating at senior government levels, particularly in Canada (Trudeau's Guelph speech), the Netherlands, and Germany..... It also appears likely that the Alliance posture on MBFR will be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting."

In addition, Chancellor Kohl has written to the President, pleading for a new Western initiative in the negotiations along the lines of the FRG approach.

Options

Against this background, the MBFR IG has examined a range of options, which are briefly summarized below. As a benchmark for comparison, the current Western position in MBFR is summarized first.

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Common to all the options is the need, following a US decision, coordinate our position first with the UK and FRG trilaterally, then with the other Allies in NATO.

All options are compatible with further work on associated measures including an enhanced Measure 6 on exchange of information, which the delegation proposed in connection with Option Three.

Current Position

The current Western position, embodied in the draft treaty tabled on July 8, 1982, envisages the following sequence of steps:

- Agree on data (i.e., current totals for NATO and Warsaw Pact military manpower in Central Europe).

- Agree on size of reductions to parity, at about 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground and air personnel combined, on each side.

- Agree on verification measures (a package of seven verification and confidence-building measures is contained in Annex II to the Western draft treaty).

- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.

- Implement verification measures and reductions.

- US reduces 13,000 ground personnel in first stage; USSR reduces 30,000.

- All direct participants reduce in three subsequent stages.

- Reductions to be completed within seven years.

Option One: Retain the current approach requiring agreement on data and a verification package as prerequisites for treaty signature and initial US-Soviet reductions.

Under this option a short-term and a long-term approach are suggested. Both essentially retain the principles of the current approach as defined by its sequence of steps. The longer-term approach, however, suggests fundamental modifications to elements of our MBFR position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive study of its ramifications. The short-term proposal is designed to press the East for further movement on verification and to serve as a response to the latest Eastern proposals, while avoiding conflict with longer-range possibilities.

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Near-term Proposals

Alternatives under this approach all require redrafting the current verification annex to the West's draft treaty, especially improving our exchange of information measure, but accepting part of the East's language for other measures where possible. Alternative presentations follow:

- present new draft verification annex (this would respond to Eastern claim that we have not modified our position since 1979, but would risk rejection of the whole based on reference to unacceptable parts);

- present modified elements of the annex (this would prolong discussion and perhaps provide more negotiating flexibility to engage the East in discussion of modalities of specific measures);

- propose a joint drafting exercise on verification provisions (this would probably appear to be the most positive form of response and might elicit greater movement by the East, but might be taken by some as a signal that the sides were much closer than they are).

Longer-term Proposals

The following proposals require study for possible adoption in the long-term:

- change from manpower to force structure (or other unit of account) in our data discussion and for specification of reductions and limitations;

- modify our position on exceptions to the ceilings for exercise purposes;

- modify our position on the reduction of armaments;

- examine the staging of reductions, including consideration of more significant initial reductions, reaching parity quicker, and possible inclusion of other non-indigenous forces in initial reductions;

- agree with Allies prior to treaty signature on a set of graduated, automatic responses to low-level warning events.

Option Two: Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature, but before reductions; then reduce to parity

This option envisages the following sequence:

- Agree on parity goal.

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- Agree on verification measures proposed by the West.
- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.
- Implement the verification measures.
- Agree on data.
- Agree on size of reductions to parity.
- Implement reductions in stages, with verification of residual levels following each stage.

Option Three: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions (Delegation option)

This option envisages the following sequence:

(1) Agree on verification measures proposed by West, including format for the exchange of information (Associated Measure 6), and on sequence for reductions and implementing verification measures.

(2) Agree on an interim agreement of 30 months' duration containing the following points:

- Initial US-Soviet reductions of 13,000-30,000 with exit entry points, to be completed with 12 months.

- Following these reductions, a non-increase commitment on collective level of each side's manpower for period of 18 months.

- At beginning of freeze, sides would provide information on forces according to Associated Measure 6 format, and would implement all verification measures to confirm information.

- After 18-month freeze, if sides satisfied that force data information provided was accurate, sides would proceed to sign and ratify formal treaty covering reductions to parity in three years, with amount of each side's reductions specified in treaty based on the agreed data and with all verification measures in effect from outset. If sides not satisfied that data/information is correct, all obligations would be voided.

(3) Sign and implement this interim agreement (initial reductions and freeze).

(4) Continue negotiations on draft treaty.

(5) If data agreement reached by end of 18-month freeze period, sign and ratify treaty on reductions to parity in 3 years.

(6) Implement treaty reductions to parity.

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Option: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions on basis of mutual example.

This option envisages the following sequence:

- US and USSR agree on size of initial US-Soviet reductions, and withdraw them on basis of mutual example, through designated permanent exit/entry points.
- Following these reductions, the sides would enter into numerically specified commitments not to increase collective level of manpower, based either on agreed data or on no-agreed data provided by each side provided agreement reached on all verification measures proposed by West. Duration of this commitment limited to specified time.
- If sides satisfied that data agreement has been reached, sides would sign and ratify a treaty on reductions to parity, with reductions specified based on the agreed data, along lines of current Western draft treaty.

Option: Postpone data agreement until after large US-Soviet Phase I Reduct. ons.

This option envisages the following sequence:

- Agree on size of "minimum" US (e.g., 25,000) and Soviet (e.g., 60,000) reductions.
- Agree on residual ceilings for US (about 200,000) and USSR (about 400,000).
- Agree on verification measures West has proposed.
- Sign and ratify agreement.
- Implement these reductions and verification measures.
- Agreement that these ceilings had been reached would provide agreed data base.
- All direct participants would enter into "mutual political commitment" not to take actions which would undermine the objective of parity, for fixed duration, during which agreement might be reached on data and the process for reductions to parity.
- If agreement reached on data, sign and ratify and implement treaty on reductions to parity, similar to Western draft treaty.

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**OPTION II - POSTPONEMENT OF DATA AGREEMENT
UNTIL AFTER TREATY SIGNATURE, BUT BEFORE REDUCTIONS;
THEN REDUCTIONS TO PARITY**

I. Description of Option

This option is would establish a sequence of: treaty signature, verification, data agreement, then reduction in stages, with further verification and agreement on force levels before each stage. Its rationale is that it would: (i) answer Soviet charges that the West seeks information on its force levels without being willing to commit itself to reductions or to use inflated intelligence figures to pursue unfair advantage; (ii) if rejected by the Soviets, place them on the record as opposing verification; and (iii) if accepted, permit resolution of the data dispute through actual observation, while (iv) providing the West with a means of halting the reductions process at the first indication of Soviet non-compliance.

A. Verification:

The West's full package of Associated Measures would be accepted by the East prior to treaty signature, and would be a precondition for such signature. They would be formally modified in the treaty, which would (except for postponement of data agreement and likely modification in the number of reductions phases) be the 1982 Western draft treaty.

Implementation would begin after treaty signature and before reductions, and would continue in stages during the reductions process (see C. below). Agreement on residual force levels would be required prior to each reductions tranche.

This option does not in any way diminish the effectiveness of the West's verification package. As with the current Western approach, the East would be committed by treaty to the verification measures, and would know that any impediments placed in the way of implementation would prevent all progress towards reductions. While initial implementation would precede data agreement, Western data could de facto remain the baseline, as we would be under no obligation to proceed with reductions unless we were satisfied with the results of the initial verification, and we could set our own standards for "being satisfied".

As with all MBFR options, the basic difficulty in assessing acceptability is uncertainty about ultimate Soviet willingness to countenance any agreement leading to a parity outcome. This option does, however answer Soviet charges that we seek to obtain information on their force structure without making any real commitment to reductions. We would in effect be offering

upon implementation of satisfactory verification measures leading to data agreement. Whether this would be more palatable to the Soviets than our current position is uncertain, but it could hardly be less so. At any rate, Soviet objections of this proposal would represent a propaganda windfall for us, as it would enable us to point out that here, as in other arms control endeavours, a basic stumbling block is Soviet unwillingness to accept effective verification. The likelihood of Soviet compliance again depends ultimately upon uncertain Soviet objectives. But since satisfactory compliance would be a prerequisite for each stage of reductions, inadequate compliance would simply halt the reductions process without placing the West in a disadvantageous position, if the reductions tranches were small enough (see C.).

B. Data agreement:

Data agreement would initially be reached following treaty signature and after implementation of the West's package of Associate Measures. It would be required after each reductions tranche in order for the next tranche to occur.

This approach could be used with a variety of different units of account. Clearly, it could be used most effectively with whatever unit of account the intelligence community felt best permitted accurate monitoring and unequivocal verification.

C. Scale and Phases of Reductions:

The exact number of reductions tranches would depend largely upon two factors: intelligence community monitoring requirements, and the need for the tranches to be relatively small so that in the event of shortfall of Eastern reductions in a particular tranche (which would be exposed by subsequent verification and would stop the reductions process), the West would not be significantly disadvantaged militarily.

D. Treaty Signature:

A formal MBFR treaty setting forth the verification and reductions process described above, and incorporating the other aspects of the Western draft treaty of 1982, would be signed in Vienna and ratified by the Senate. (Given their experiences with SALT II, the Soviets are highly unlikely to accept anything short of ratification.) Signature would be followed by verification, data agreement, and the staged reductions process.

E. Impact on NATO's ability to respond to a crisis:

This would not differ from the impact of an MBFR agreement under the present Western position.

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A. Consultations with the Allies:

We would seek initial trilateral agreement on the acceptability of this approach (the UK will doubtless regard it as overadventurous, the FRG as overconservative, but we might be able to get each to agree to this middle position to guard against something "worse" from their perspectives). If such agreement was forthcoming, we could either move directly to introduce the proposal in NATO, or carry out bilateral explorations with the Soviets and further trilateral evaluations of their response (see B) prior to discussion in the Alliance.

B. Bilateral and Multilateral Channels:

The relative emphasis given to a bilateral or multilateral channels would depend upon the basic aims of our move. If the principal goal was to give a high public profile to our desire for progress in MBFR while forcing the Soviets to go on record as opposing verification, we would want to move the proposal quickly to the multilateral channel. If we placed a higher value on seeking Soviet acceptance of this proposal, and initial soundings indicated genuine Soviet interest in it, we would wish to continue with more extensive and explicit bilateral contacts before going public.

C. Likely Soviet Response:

As mentioned above, it is impossible to ascertain accurately the degree of Soviet interest this proposal would generate, given our uncertainty as to what the Soviet bottom line for an MBFR agreement is. Any interest that was present would (as with other options) presumably be communicated bilaterally. The East could be expected to respond to a formal Western tabling of a proposal along these lines by a statement highlighting its supposed inequities and calling for the West to agree to the current Eastern proposals.

D. Implications for INF, CDE

INF deployments will certainly have taken place long before this or any MBFR proposal could bear visible fruit. The potential usefulness of this move for smoothing the progress of continued deployments by highlighting Western commitment to arms control would clearly depend in part on how much intensity the INF issue continued to generate following initial deployments. Even if INF continues to be a contentious issue, however, it is unlikely that any move in a non-nuclear and relatively forgotten arms control endeavour such as MBFR would have much countervailing effect.

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5 January 1984

A NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE IN MBFR

SUMMARY

Key Elements

1. A new unit of account for reductions based on manpower in combat/combat support (C/CS) forces rather than total manpower.
2. Prior agreement on initial data pertaining to C/CS forces.
3. Parity at 900,000 total (700,000 ground forces) retained as ultimate reductions goal.
4. Sub-ceiling established for C/CS ground forces.
5. Phased reductions specified before treaty signature
 - Interim and final subceilings on C/CS forces
 - Number of C/CS forces each side must reduce to reach the interim and final subceilings
 - Schedule (flowrate) of reductions.
6. Five year reductions program: year 1, Soviet-U.S. reductions on a 13:30 ratio; year 2, reductions by all direct participants; year 3, verification of interim ceilings; years 4 and 5, completion of reductions.
7. Non-Circumvention clause to prevent circumvention of C/CS categorizations.
8. Armaments clause added. Possible features include:
 - UK formula: i.e., armaments to be withdrawn with personnel, or placed in storage, or transferred to reserve forces, or destroyed.
 - Common Ceilings on major weapons systems, i.e., tanks, APC's, artillery, aircraft.
9. All verification measures to apply from outset to C/CS forces.
10. Some modification to existing verification measures necessary: Inspections Measure (AM 4) to focus more obviously on verification; Exchange of information measure (AM 6) to require greater disaggregation; Notification and observation of out of garrison activities measures (AMs 1 & 2) to drop extended area provision.

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Elements of a New Western Initiative in MBFR

1. New Unit of Account for Reductions

Reductions to be specified in terms of combat/combat support (C/CS) rather than total manpower.

Benefits are:

A. Focuses negotiations on forces:

- Posing greatest military threat
- Having more apparent organizational structure, and therefore, greater potential for monitoring and verification

B. Applies reduction/verification to a greater percentage of Soviet ground forces than US ground forces

- 74% of total Eastern forces are C/CS
- 85% of Soviet
- 72% of total NATO
- 70% of US

C. Exploits an Eastern offer (October 1983) of explicit data and mandatory verification of reductions for "the bulk" of the "most substantial military contingents" to be reduced.

2. Agreement on Initial Data Before Treaty Signature

Agreement on initial data pertaining to C/CS forces shall be reached before treaty signature and any reductions.

A. Consistent with Presidential Directive (October 1983) and longstanding Western position that sides must agree on current force levels before any reductions.

B. Eliminates uncertainty regarding size of required reductions. Asymmetrical reductions still justified because West-East

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ratio of C/CS forces is approximately the same as for total forces.

- Total = 1:1.21

- C/CS = 1:1.25

C. Provides a way out of the data impasse.

- Requires the East to present new data on forces.
- If East continues to put forward inaccurate data, would make inaccuracy more apparent because Western intelligence can estimate personnel in C/CS forces more precisely than it can personnel in total forces.

3. With New Unit of Account, Parity Remains Ultimate Reduction Goal

The present East-West consensus on parity at 900,000 uniformed personnel (with sub-ceiling of 700,000 ground forces) on each side is to be retained as the ultimate MBFR goal.

A. The 900,000 figure is important not for its magnitude but for the principle of reductions to parity. The principle, already accepted by the East, provides the justification for asymmetrical reductions. To abandon the figure is to risk the East's backing away from the principle of parity. The new-unit-of-account proposal retains parity at 900,000.

B. Retaining the 900,000 figure also averts lengthy debates (within Administration, NATO, and Vienna forum) on appropriate parity figure.

4. Sub-Ceilings for Ground C/CS Forces

A. In the reductions area, C/CS ground forces now account for 74% and 72%, respectively, of Pact and NATO ground forces. We propose that, after reductions to parity, the

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remaining C/CS ground forces should account for no more than about 74% of the total remaining ground forces.

- B. In absolute numbers this would be a sub-ceiling of approximately 520,000 C/CS ground forces out of a ceiling of 700,000 on total ground forces.

5. Five Year Program of Reductions

The current Western Draft Treaty provides for a 7-year program of reductions to parity. This program could advantageously be compressed to 5 years as follows: First year, US-Soviet reductions of C/CS forces on a 13:30 ratio; second year, reductions by all direct participants to specified interim ceilings on C/CS forces; third year, no reductions (implementation of verification procedures for interim ceilings on C/CS forces); fourth and fifth years, completion of reductions to parity--900,000 total with sub-ceilings of 700,000 total ground forces and 520,000 C/CS ground forces.

- A. A shorter period for reductions would apply associated measures (AM's) to all uniformed forces sooner than the seven-year program would. (See scope and timing of AM's in Para 9 below.)
- B. As the East has proposed a 3-year reductions program, it would presumably welcome a shortening of the Western program.

6. Phased Reductions Specified In the Treaty

Reductions provisions will specify:

- A. Interim and final sub-ceilings on C/CS forces.
- B. Numbers of C/CS forces each side must reduce to reach the interim and final sub-ceilings.

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- C. Schedule (flow rate) of reductions. This schedule will be designed to ensure that at no point in the reductions process is the West in a more disadvantageous military position vis-a-vis the East than prior to initiation of reductions.

7. Non-Circumvention Clause

Because the new unit of account for reductions focuses on C/CS forces, roughly a quarter of total forces would not be subject to reductions, and, during the reductions period, would not be covered by verification measures. It is important to include a legal commitment in the treaty to prevent the East from arming rear services personnel, equipping them for combat support, or train them for combat or combat support tasks.

- A. Cooperative East-West verification measures will not apply to service units during the reductions period, but full national intelligence means would monitor these rear service forces and guard against Eastern miscategorization of forces in the reductions area. (See Scope and Timing of AM's in Para 9 below.)
- B. The non-circumvention clause also will include a provision that any violation of the clause would be cause for treaty abrogation.
- C. Suspected violations of the non-circumvention clause can be raised in the Joint Commission, and if not resolved to the satisfaction of the West, can be used as cause for treaty abrogation.

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8. Armaments

An armaments clause is to be added to the Western draft treaty. Possible features include:

- The UK formula: i.e., Armaments of reduced forces are to be withdrawn from the area, or placed in storage, or transferred to reserve forces, or destroyed.
- Common ceilings on major weapons systems, e.g., tanks.
 - A. The absence of a Western concept for dealing with armaments has afforded the East a propaganda opportunity to sow doubt in Western public opinion concerning the seriousness of Western governments about arms control. This doubt could lead to a lessening of support among Western parliaments for needed conventional force modernization. INF deployment was accomplished largely because the USG was engaged in INF negotiations and was perceived to have a credible arms control stance in Geneva. Continuing to stone-wall on the armaments issue in Vienna could give credence to the Eastern charge that Western governments are not serious about achieving a conventional arms control agreement in Central Europe, thereby jeopardizing continued parliamentary and public support for conventional force modernization programs.
 - B. The absence of an armaments provision in the Western draft also leaves the field open to wild proposals currently in circulation, e.g., disarmament zones in Central Europe, inclusion of short range nuclear systems in MBFR, and combining INF and MBFR.

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9. Verification of Reductions and Residual Ceilings

All verification measures are to apply during the reductions phase but only to C/CS forces. (National intelligences means would monitor compliance with the non-circumvention clause.)

- A. Prior to treaty signature, the full Western package of associated measures (as amended, see Paras 10 and 11 below) must be agreed, including details of content and modalities for implementation.
- B. During the reductions process, the complete set of associated measures would apply to all C/CS forces in the reduction area, not merely to those being reduced.
- C. Upon completion of agreed reductions (end of year 5), the complete set of verification measures would apply to all military forces within the reductions area.
- D. A provision should also be included requiring the sides to exchange information (AM 6) in year 3 of the reductions on rear service forces projected to be part of the residual 900,000 ceiling force two years hence. This projected data would facilitate national monitoring of levels of rear service support personnel.

10. Enhancing Verification

To make the Western Verification package more effective, certain features of Annex II to the Western Draft Treaty should be amended.

- A. Associated measure 4 (AM 4) (inspections) might be restructured to focus clearly on verification rather than early warning.

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- Deemphasizing the early warning aspect of AM 4 might allow a more stringent inspections measure to be negotiated--one that would be more effective in monitoring treaty compliance. (See Para 11 below for discussion of early warning).
- The East has long argued that the West's inspection measure is intended more for intelligence collection than for verification of treaty compliance. Removing early warning aspects of AM 4 would decrease the credibility of this Eastern argument against the West's inspection measure.

B. Verification would be enhanced if AM 6 (exchange of information) were changed to require greater disaggregation of data.

- The current AM 6 only requires exchange of information down to division level whereas recent bilateral off-the-record discussions in Vienna, e.g., between the FRG and GDR reps, suggest that agreement on exchange of data to battalion level may be possible.
- The greater the disaggregation, the more detailed the picture of the types of Eastern forces in the reductions areas and the more effective the Western verification system.

11. Early Warning

AM's 1 and 2 (Pre-Notification of Out-of-Garrison activities and observation of this activity) could be amended. They would

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apply only in the reductions area, leaving the extended area negotiations to the CDE forum where the negotiations mandate applies to Soviet territory.

- A. The original FRG argument for extending the AM 1 and 2 area into Soviet territory was to avoid pinpointing "Germany" as the geographical focus of a disarmament regime. With the CDE zone now extending inside the Soviet Union to the Ural Mountains, the FRG may be less insistent on having the extended area feature in the MBFR package.
- B. The East continues to insist that AM's 1 and 2 are impossible to negotiate in Vienna so long as they contain the extended area provision.
- C. It may be possible to negotiate more stringent AM's 1 and 2 if they apply only in the reductions area than if they apply also to Soviet territory.

12. Safeguards Against Non-Compliance

No treaty can provide an absolute guarantee of treaty compliance, but this proposal contains a number of safeguards against non-compliance:

- A. No reductions will begin until the West is satisfied with Eastern data on C/CS forces, and the size and timing of reductions to be taken by each side.
- B. When reductions are underway, the complete set of verification measures will apply to all C/CS forces to ensure that reductions proceed as contracted.

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- C. Also, while reductions are underway, national intelligence means will be applied to Eastern rear service forces to ensure compliance with the non-circumvention clause.
- D. A joint commission will become active at treaty signature and any suspected violations of treaty compliance pertaining to either the reductions process or to the non-circumvention clause may be raised in this forum and, if not resolved to the satisfaction of the West, be considered cause for treaty abrogation.
- E. In year three of the reductions process, interim ceilings on C/CS forces will be verified, giving the West another opportunity to abrogate the treaty if the East is not in compliance with the agreement.
- F. In year three, the sides also exchange data on rear service forces projected to be part of the residual common ceilings. These data serve as another measure of compliance. At the three year point, they test the East's willingness to continue to provide required data; and at the 5 year point, they give a precise yardstick for measuring Eastern compliance with total residual ceilings.
- G. At the end of the reductions period (5 years), the complete set of verification measures apply to all uniformed personnel in the reductions area to verify attainment of agreed common ceilings and sub-ceilings. If the ceilings and sub-ceilings are not verified to the satisfaction of the West at this point, the treaty can be abrogated.

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- H. For the remaining life of the treaty, compliance will be monitored by the complete set of verification measures augmented by the full range of national intelligence means, and whatever pertinent CDE measures may be eventually negotiated.
- I. While the above provisions will not guarantee compliance, they will, when taken together, act as effective safeguards against non-compliance. In any event, there are a number of mechanisms in play at all times in the treaty life which will allow abrogation in the event of non-compliance.

13. General Benefits of Adopting the Initiative

The general benefits of adopting the initiative as USG MBFR policy are that it:

- A. Is consistent with Presidential decision that reductions be based on prior agreement of initial data and application of full set of verification measures.
- B. Holds the East to commitment to parity while giving the East an implicit opportunity to bring their force levels in the area more in line with Western data estimates.
- C. Improves prospects for prior data agreement by focusing the data discussion initially on C/CS forces--where the discrepancy in East-West data is less, and Western verification capabilities are better.
- D. Takes advantage of the opening provided by the East's recently expressed willingness to specify, prior to signature of agreement, numerical data on "the bulk" of reductions of the "most substantial military contingents."

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- E. Contains a non-circumvention clause that would help overcome possible criticism by certain allies and Congress that the West would be ignoring over 25% of Pact uniformed personnel by using a C/CS unit-of-account for specified reductions.
- F. Holds to the 900,000 common ceiling thereby maintaining fundamental NATO agreement on the basic MBFR objective and avoiding extensive delays that would be required to work out a new MBFR framework within NATO.
- G. Would be responsive to allied concerns that the West offer a new initiative in Vienna, but does not entail postponing data agreement as the FRG option would require.
- H. Requires only minimal changes in the Western Draft Treaty of July 1982.

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Attachment 1

DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP ON A WESTERN INITIATIVE IN MBFR

1. In order to enhance the prospects for an agreement consistent with long-held Western MBFR objectives, the Ad Hoc group is authorized to inform the East that the West is willing to make the following changes in the framework proposed in the Western Draft Treaty of July 7, 1982:

- A. Amend appropriate provisions in the text of the treaty and Annex 1 to require that reductions commitments be confined only to combat and combat support forces. The West will be prepared to indicate which general types of forces it considers should be included on each side in the category "combat and combat support" forces and which forces would not be included in this category, but the precise definition of these types of forces would be subject to negotiation.
- B. Modify Annex 1 to provide for the following staged reductions of combat and combat support forces over a five-year period according to the following program:
First year, US and Soviet reductions on ratio of 13:30;
second year, reductions by all direct participants;
third year, a one-year period to monitor an interim residual level; fourth and fifth years, completion of reductions by all direct participants.
- C. Add a provision in the text of the treaty that both sides will avoid any action with respect to the overall level of uniformed personnel in the area (as defined in

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- Article III. 5 of the Western Draft Treaty) which would circumvent the net effect of reductions of combat and combat support personnel specified in the agreement.
- D. Modify the treaty text and Annex 1 to state that upon completion of these reductions, i.e. 5 years after entry into force of the agreement, the total number of uniformed military personnel in the area shall not exceed the agreed levels of approximately 700,000 ground force personnel (of which combat/combat support personnel will not exceed 520,000) and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined.
- E. Amend the appropriate provisions concerning associated measures to make clear that the measures contained in Annex 2 of the Western Draft Treaty would apply during the reductions, these measures would apply to all uniformed personnel in the area in order to monitor compliance with the obligation not to exceed the agreed common collective levels.
- F. Amend appropriate provisions of the protocol to the treaty and Annex 2 in order to confine the area of application of all measures listed in Annex 2 to the agreed area of reductions.
- G. Amend the proposed inspection measure in Annex 2 to focus this measure more explicitly on the verification of reductions and limitations, by emphasizing, among other things, inspections of garrisons and force structure and removing aerial inspection.

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- H. Add to the exchange of information measure a clearer definition of which forces would be covered, including units down to the regimental/brigade level, in this exchange.
- I. Change the title of the proposed agreement to include the term "armaments" and include in the treaty text a provision to the effect that the armaments of reduced forces shall be withdrawn from the area, or placed in storage, or transferred to reserve forces, or destroyed.
2. Except for the foregoing modifications, all other provisions of the Western Draft Treaty of July 1982, its protocol and Annexes remain unchanged.

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OPTION 3: POSTPONEMENT OF DATA AGREEMENT UNTIL
AFTER INITIAL U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS

Description

The sides would negotiate an interim agreement of limited duration covering: initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, a freeze period during which force data/information would be exchanged and verified to the satisfaction of both sides, and a declaration of intent to sign a formal treaty on reductions to parity on the basis of the verified (agreed) data. Details of the verification measures to be implemented at each stage would be agreed.

This interim agreement would include the following points:

1. Initial US/Soviet reductions would be completed within one year. The US would withdraw 13,000 and the Soviets 30,000. The US and USSR would exchange lists of the units/personnel to be withdrawn. Exit/entry points would be established for U.S.-Soviet forces.
2. Following completion of these initial reductions, the sides would agree not to increase the collective level of their military manpower in the area of reductions for a period of 18 months.
 - A. At the beginning of this period, the sides would provide information on their forces existing in the area according to the following format: (this would be AM-6, i.e., information and data on structure down to battalion/regiment level, including numerical strengths of units).
 - B. At the beginning of this period, the sides would also put into effect the following verification measures: permanent exit/entry points with observers (AM-5); on-site inspections (AM-4); prior notification of military movements into area (AM-3). The consultative commission would also be established.
 - C. The sides would have 18 months to confirm, through the AMs and national means, that the data/information provided under AM-6 was accurate. Questions could be raised in the consultative commission.
 - D. If, at the end of this 18-month period, the sides were satisfied that the information provided by each side was accurate, the sides would sign and ratify a formal treaty covering reductions to parity within three years. All AMs would be in effect during the three years and for the duration of the treaty. The amount of each side's reductions would be specified in the treaty based on the force data agreed at the end of the freeze period.

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A. If, at the end of that 18-month period, either side (through procedures agreed by the consultative commission) declared itself not satisfied that the information provided was accurate, all obligations would be voided.

3. The sides would continue to work out the details of the treaty on reductions to parity during the 30-month duration of this interim agreement.

Treaty Signature and Other Modalities

The understanding described above would be worked out by the delegations and would provide the basis for an interim agreement. There is flexibility on the actual form of the interim agreement. An executive agreement of limited duration (30 months), signed by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State of all direct participants, might be appropriate. The interim agreement would go into effect upon signature.

If the sides agreed to proceed with reductions to parity, that agreement would be a formal treaty to be ratified according to the constitutional procedures of each state. Signature could be by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State.

Scale and Phases of Reductions

After the initial understanding is signed:

-- The U.S. would withdraw 13,000 troops and the USSR would withdraw 30,000 troops. Withdrawals would be completed within one year.

-- After these reductions, neither side would increase the collective level of its military manpower. This freeze period would last 18 months.

If, after this 30-month period, the sides decide to sign the treaty, then, after treaty ratification:

-- The sides would take the specified amounts of reductions leading to the establishment of the agreed common collective ceilings. These reductions would be completed within three years.

Verification Measures

The verification measures to accompany each of the reduction steps would be specified in the interim agreement. Thus, before any reductions were taken, the sides would agree that:

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-- For the initial U.S.-Soviet withdrawals: the U.S. and USSR would exchange lists of the forces to be withdrawn; exit/entry points would be established through which all withdrawals and all U.S. and Soviet forces entering would pass; non-interference with NTM. These verification measures would be in effect for the 12-month duration of the withdrawal stage. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to verify the withdrawals and to monitor U.S. and Soviet force levels)

-- For the freeze period: at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would provide the information of its forces existing in the area according to the previously agreed format, and the following verification measures would go into effect: exit/entry points, on-site inspection, prior notification of movements into area. These verification measures would last for the 18-month duration of the freeze period. (Comment: The purposes of the verification measures would be to confirm the data/information provided and to confirm/ update our data base for Eastern forces).

-- For reductions to parity: If the treaty is signed, all verification measures would go into effect upon ratification and would continue for the duration of the treaty. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to monitor and verify reductions and maintenance of the common collective ceilings.)

Assessment of effectiveness. For the freeze period and for reductions to parity under the treaty, if signed, the effectiveness of the verification measures would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

For the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, the measures noted would be adequate to confirm the withdrawals and to keep track of U.S.-Soviet force movements for the purpose of monitoring U.S. and Soviet force levels. The absence of on-site inspection for this period of one year would have only marginal effect on our ability to monitor the obligations undertaken.

Likelihood of Soviet acceptance/compliance. The likelihood of the East accepting Western verification measures would be somewhat enhanced under this option (compared to the current Western draft treaty) since the West would have met the East part way on the reductions issues of Eastern interest. However, given the requirement for data agreement (and its presumption of large asymmetrical reductions) prior to the treaty on reductions to parity, it remains unlikely that the East would accept this Option as is.

For the treaty on reductions to parity, the likelihood of Soviet compliance with obligations would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty. It can be expected that the East will take a very narrow interpretation of their obligations and that there will be disputes. However, if the East did agree to the data agreement

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required for Western acceptance of the treaty, it must be presumed that the East generally intends to comply with their legal obligations.

During the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions phase and the freeze period, it might be argued that the East would have less incentive to comply since the obligations undertaken would not be in treaty form. They might be willing to take greater risks at marginal cheating. However, since the interim agreement is of limited duration, the East might consider the risk of detection too great. There is a risk that the East will not provide accurate data/information under AM-6, but that risk exists with the current Western draft treaty and its requirement for agreed data prior to reductions. It could be argued that the risks were less under this Option 3 since we would not have to abrogate a treaty in the event of Eastern non-compliance. There is inherently some risk of Eastern cheating, but large-scale cheating or misreporting should be ascertainable, especially since this option provides an 18-month verification period.

Data Agreement

The interim agreement would specify that, at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would exchange information on their forces in the area at that time, according to an agreed format. That format (Associated Measure 6) would be described in the interim agreement. The sides would then have 18 months to check out the accuracy of the information provided.

The enhanced Associated Measure 6 provides that information would be given on force structure down to battalion level, and would include numerical strengths of the units. Thus, instead of data agreement solely on the basis of aggregate totals of manpower as under our current draft treaty, data agreement would be based on force structure which is more compatible with our own national means of monitoring Eastern forces. Also, unlike our current draft treaty where we are essentially demanding Eastern agreement to our current data, under Option 3 and the enhanced Associated Measure 6, we would be determining the accuracy or non-accuracy of the specific information provided by the East under Associated Measure 6.

Possible Negotiating Strategy

Consultations with Allies

If this option were selected, we would first call a U.S.-U.K.-FRG trilateral meeting to coordinate positions. Such a meeting could be held in December; alternatively, the three could reach agreement on the margins of the December 8-9 NATO Ministerial. Although the FRG prefers minimal linkage among the three steps and wanted a NATO initiative phrased in terms of statements of principle rather than as a new proposal for an agreement as this option is

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now structured, they would probably support this option without significant change. The U.K. prefers not to make any initiative on data and would prefer their own option if a data initiative were deemed desirable. The U.K. would resist this option, but if the U.S. and FRG were to insist on it, the U.K. would probably acquiesce but would probably suggest changes.

Once the U.S., U.K. and FRG agreed to a coordinated position, we would introduce this option into NATO for Allied approval. Most of our Allies support making a data initiative, so there would probably be little difficulty in gaining Allied acceptance. If the option were introduced into NATO by the end of this year, guidance to the Ad Hoc Group could probably be agreed in time to table the initiative at the beginning of next round, which begins January 26.

Multilateral and Bilateral Channels

A primary purpose of Option 3 is to neutralize Eastern pressure on reductions issues so that we can engage in detailed discussion of data/verification. We should pursue this objective both in the formal negotiations and in bilateral channels.

If this option were selected, we should not let the current negotiating round end without bilateral contact. We want the Soviets to continue to give attention to verification issues during the recess. We should therefore indicate that we will have a constructive response to their February/June proposals next round and that we then expect them to be prepared to engage in detailed discussion of verification. Once the initiative is tabled in Vienna, we would pursue such discussions with the Soviets, primarily in Vienna, with the objective of pressing the East to accept the substance as well as the principle of our verification measures.

In the formal negotiations, we may want to establish working groups to work on associated measures and reductions issues, which would permit us to manage the interface between the bilateral and multilateral channel by directing formal Allied discussions on verification issues, thus ensuring that the bilateral channel does not get too far ahead of the Allies.

Likely Soviet Response

Despite the fact that this option would not meet several important Soviet interests (it does not accept mutual example cuts; it retains the requirement for agreed data at a later stage), the Soviets would welcome the data move as a step in the right direction. The Soviets will probably attempt to use Western interest in discussion of verification issues as leverage to gain Western concessions on reductions issues, e.g., on armaments.

Nevertheless, it would seem that the Soviets would agree to more detailed discussion of data/verification issues. They have

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already told us that they would be able to elaborate their position further if the West would respond to their overall proposals. The fact that the Soviet Military Representative has, apparently, taken personal initiative in furthering our data/verification discussions indicates that such Soviet statements have at least some backing in the Soviet Defense Ministry and thus some potential for development.

Where such discussions might lead is uncertain: probably not to an agreement, since we would still face the problem of asymmetrical reductions even if the Soviets were to make further concessions on verification. But detailed discussions of data/verification, especially on our enhanced Associated Measure 6, could only be useful to us.

Impact on INF, CDE

If the Soviets walk out of INF, our Allies will probably be anxious to step up activity in other arms control forums, including (and perhaps especially) MBFR, to underline the fact that the West remains flexible on arms control. In any case, INF discussions will probably be resumed sometime next year, one way or another, and the Allies will continue to be concerned that the overall Western negotiating posture be positive and credible. A Western MBFR initiative along the lines of this option would meet these interests.

It is in the U.S. interest to keep CDE focused on confidence-building measures and to avoid discussion of force reductions in that 35-nation forum. MBFR remains the only forum we have for addressing force reductions as an Alliance and in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context. Even those of our Allies who share our view that MBFR is the preferred forum for force reductions equally want to ensure that such discussions remain active in one forum or another. Continued stalemate in MBFR will encourage our Allies to look to CDE for that purpose. This option would spark useful activity in MBFR and would bolster NATO's public posture on arms control.

Impact on NATO's Ability to Respond to Crisis

NATO military studies of the Western 1979 package of associated measures concluded that the package could assist NATO political decision-making in time of crisis, since a violation of an associated measure would add to NATO's warning indicators and information about Warsaw Pact intentions. The alert activity exception to Associated Measure One, and the Western requirements for negotiated exceptions to the common ceiling were designed to protect NATO mobilization/reinforcement capability in a crisis.

This option does not change the substance of the Western package of associated measures (it does delay implementation of on-site inspection and exchange of information for one year) or the Western position on alert activities or exceptions. Therefore, the assessment of this option's impact on NATO's ability to respond in a crisis should be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

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NATO/WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA (NGA) 1NATO MANPOWER 1

	<u>GROUND</u>	<u>AIR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US	214,000	41,200	255,200
CANADA	4,300	1,400	5,700
FRANCE	48,000	-	48,000
UK	61,950	11,400	73,350
BELGIUM	68,400	20,750	89,150
FRG	340,500	109,825	450,325
LUX.	675	-	675
NETHERLANDS	<u>66,250</u>	<u>17,850</u>	<u>84,100</u>
TOTAL	804,075	202,425	1,006,500

NATO ESTIMATE OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER 1

	<u>GROUND</u>	<u>AIR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	486,300	56,020	542,320
GDR	122,800	37,740	160,540
POLAND	222,525	91,010	313,535
CSSR	<u>147,840</u>	<u>59,020</u>	<u>206,860</u>
TOTAL	979,465	243,790	1,223,255

WARSAW PACT TABLED DATA A/O 1 AUGUST 1980

	<u>GROUND</u>	<u>AIR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USSR	404,800	40,500	445,300
GDR	93,000	29,800	122,800
POLAND	161,800	67,300	229,100
CSSR	<u>137,100</u>	<u>44,700</u>	<u>181,800</u>
TOTAL	796,700	182,300	979,000

DISCREPANCY: NATO ESTIMATE AND PACT TABLED DATA

GROUND: 182,765

AIR: 61,490

TOTAL: 244,255

¹ NATO data derived from NATO document AC/276-D (83)6, "NATO Forces in the NGA." Warsaw Pact data derived from NATO document MCM-66-83, Warsaw Pact Forces in the NGA."

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